Calder & Vance International Sanctions & Compliance Counsel

Export Controls & Dual-Use · OFAC

OFAC vs OFSI: Licence-exception eligibility compared

A technology exporter with customers in multiple jurisdictions closes a deal, checks the end-user, and assumes a licence exception applies. Then a second look reveals the buyer has UK ties as well as US-controlled content. Does the OFAC authorisation also satisfy OFSI? Almost certainly not. The two regimes operate parallel licensing systems with distinct eligibility criteria, different governing instruments, and separate procedural paths. Getting this wrong means the transaction is either unlawfully completed or unnecessarily delayed.

Under OFAC, licence exceptions (standing authorisations permitting defined categories of transactions without a case-by-case application) are embedded in the relevant programme-specific regulations and apply automatically when stated conditions are met. Under OFSI, the equivalent mechanism – general licences (issued by the UK Treasury and published for use by any eligible person without a separate application) – is issued instrument by instrument and carries its own eligibility conditions, which do not mirror OFAC's. As of April 2026, a transaction that qualifies under an OFAC general or programme-specific authorisation will not automatically qualify under an OFSI general licence, and vice versa.

This analysis sets out how eligibility works under each regime, identifies the principal points of divergence, flags the cross-border complications that arise for businesses operating under both, and explains when specialist counsel is needed before a transaction proceeds.

How OFAC structures licence-exception eligibility

OFAC uses a layered authorisation system: a prohibition first, then an authorisation that may take the form of a specific licence (a case-by-case grant) or a general licence (a standing authorisation embedded in, or published alongside, the programme regulations). Eligibility for a general licence depends on satisfying each condition stated in the instrument.

The conditions are programme-specific and cannot be assumed to carry across regimes. A general licence covering certain personal-remittance transactions under one programme does not automatically authorise commercial transactions under another. In our experience, the most common eligibility error arises when compliance teams apply a general licence that covers the activity but not the counterparty, or covers the counterparty category but not the transaction type.

Eligibility conditions typically examine: the identity and status of the parties (including whether any is a specially designated national, or SDN – a person on OFAC's list of blocked parties); the nature of the goods, services, or technology transferred; the end use; and the geographic destination. Where a condition is conjunctive – that is, all elements must be met – satisfying four of five is not enough. The authorisation fails on the unsatisfied element.

The 50 percent rule (OFAC's rule that treats entities owned 50 percent or more by blocked persons as themselves blocked, even if not separately listed) interacts directly with eligibility. A general licence may expressly exclude transactions with entities owned or controlled by SDNs. Where the ownership chain has not been fully mapped, that exclusion can invalidate an apparently eligible transaction. Have you traced the beneficial ownership of your counterparty to the level the general licence requires?

OFAC administers the authorisation system under authority derived from IEEPA and other primary instruments. The legal basis matters because it determines which statutory exceptions and overrides apply, and it shapes the scope of any emergency authorisation that OFAC may issue in response to changed circumstances.

How OFSI structures general-licence eligibility

OFSI, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation within HM Treasury, administers UK financial sanctions under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (SAMLA) and the relevant thematic sanctions regulations. Its equivalent of a programme-specific general licence is the published general licence: a document issued by OFSI under the relevant thematic regulations that permits a defined category of person to carry out a described transaction without a separate specific licence.

The structure looks similar to OFAC's, but the eligibility architecture is different in three material respects. First, OFSI general licences are issued for specific purposes that track the thematic sanctions regulations rather than a single consolidated list of exclusions. Second, each general licence states its own expiry date or review period; OFAC general licences may also lapse or be amended, but the pace and frequency of change differ. Third, ownership and control (the UK test for whether a non-listed entity is caught through a listed person's interest) includes a control limb that goes beyond pure percentage ownership.

Under the UK ownership and control test, a non-listed entity can be caught even where a designated person owns less than a controlling percentage, if that person exercises significant influence or control. This is a broader net than OFAC's mechanical 50 percent threshold. In our cross-border practice, we regularly encounter transactions that pass the OFAC ownership screen but remain restricted under OFSI's control analysis.

OFSI general licences also impose reporting obligations on users. Where a business relies on a general licence to carry out a transaction involving a designated person, it may be required to report that use within a defined period. OFAC programme-specific authorisations can also carry reporting requirements, but the triggers and timelines differ.

Where do the regimes diverge on licence-exception eligibility?

The divergence is structural, not incidental. OFAC and OFSI operate independent legal bases, maintain separate lists, apply different ownership and control tests, and issue authorisations through distinct administrative processes. A transaction that satisfies one regime's eligibility criteria may fail the other's on every one of those dimensions.

The most operationally significant divergences are as follows.

List architecture. OFAC maintains the SDN List and associated programme lists. OFSI maintains the UK Consolidated List. A person may appear on one and not the other, or may appear on both but under different legal bases that carry different authorisation routes. Screening against one list and not the other is a recurring gap in multi-jurisdictional compliance programmes.

The ownership and control test. As noted, OFAC's threshold is mechanical – 50 percent or more ownership in aggregate. OFSI's test adds a control limb. The EU test under the relevant Council regulations similarly includes control alongside ownership. A non-listed entity caught by OFSI's control analysis may not be caught by OFAC's ownership test, producing a split result: the transaction is permitted under OFAC but blocked under OFSI.

Eligibility conditions in the authorisation text. OFAC general licences and OFSI general licences frequently define the eligible persons, permitted activities, and excluded parties differently. Particular care is needed around: professional services (legal, audit, and accounting); NGO humanitarian activity; and trade finance. Each regime has issued authorisations in these areas, but the scope is not identical and should not be assumed to align.

Reporting and record-keeping. OFAC requires transaction records to be kept for a defined period; OFSI's record-keeping and reporting obligations under SAMLA and the relevant thematic regulations are separately stated. Where a firm operates under both regimes, both sets of obligations apply concurrently, and the stricter requirement governs each point of compliance.

Revocation and amendment. Both authorities can revoke or amend a general licence with relatively short notice. Businesses that have built a transaction structure around an existing general licence need a monitoring process that catches amendments before the next shipment or payment.

A practical decision matrix illustrates the divergence. Where a proposed transaction involves a counterparty with no SDN or UK Consolidated List exposure, and the goods or services fall outside any controlled classification, a general authorisation under either regime may apply straightforwardly. Where the counterparty has a complex ownership chain that approaches either threshold, the routes split: the OFAC analysis focuses on aggregate ownership, the OFSI analysis adds the control question, and the two conclusions may differ. At that point, the slower and more restrictive result governs the transaction overall – and that result may require a specific licence under one or both regimes.

Which regime is stricter on licence-exception eligibility?

No single regime is uniformly stricter; the answer turns on the specific transaction, the counterparty, and the category of activity. However, certain patterns repeat.

For ownership-based eligibility, OFSI's broader control limb produces a stricter result in cases where a designated person falls just below the OFAC 50 percent threshold but exercises documented control. The EU test for the same question is similarly broad, making the UK–EU alignment closer to each other than either is to OFAC in this respect.

For goods and technology transactions, the position is more nuanced. OFAC's general licences under the export-control-adjacent programmes are calibrated to the EAR (the Export Administration Regulations administered by BIS) and to the Commerce Control List classifications. OFSI does not administer export licensing (that is the ECJU's function), so OFSI general licences do not reference export-control classifications directly. A dual-use item may therefore face separate OFAC, OFSI, and ECJU analyses on the same transaction, each with its own eligibility question.

In our experience advising exporters across these regimes, the practical constraint is usually whichever regime imposes the narrowest authorisation or the most burdensome condition. Where OFAC permits a transaction under a general licence but OFSI has not issued a comparable instrument, the transaction requires an OFSI-specific licence application. That application introduces a timeline that can range from weeks to months depending on the complexity and the regime's current caseload. Waiting for a specific licence to issue while holding goods under a freight contract has real cost consequences.

Equally, where OFAC has not issued a general licence but OFSI has, the US side requires either a specific licence application to OFAC or the identification of a separate OFAC authorisation. The asymmetry can favour either direction, and the comparison must be done on the specific facts.

This asymmetry is the reason we regularly advise clients to run the OFAC and OFSI analyses in parallel from the outset, rather than sequentially. Starting with the regime you know better and assuming convergence is a consistent source of compliance failure.

Cross-border complications: the EU, BIS, and secondary-sanctions risk

For businesses with EU operations or EU-nexus transactions, a third body of authorisations applies alongside OFAC and OFSI. The EU does not use the term "licence exception" in the OFAC sense; instead, it provides for derogations within the relevant Council regulations, and member states issue national authorisations under those regulations. The result is a patchwork of national instruments that can produce further divergences even within the EU single market.

The EU Blocking Regulation adds a further complication for EU-based firms. Where OFAC's secondary-sanctions measures purport to restrict EU-person conduct in relation to third parties not subject to US jurisdiction, the Blocking Regulation prohibits compliance with those measures in certain circumstances. An EU-established business that operates under both the EU sanctions regime and OFAC's secondary-sanctions perimeter may face directly conflicting obligations. That conflict cannot be resolved by eligibility analysis alone; it requires a jurisdictional assessment and, where necessary, an application to the relevant competent authority.

BIS adds a further dimension for goods, software, and technology with a US origin or a US-controlled design. The EAR applies extraterritorially through the de minimis rule and the foreign direct product rule, which can capture non-US items that incorporate or are derived from US-controlled technology. An OFSI general licence may permit a UK firm to make a payment; if the underlying transaction involves a US-controlled item, a separate BIS authorisation may still be required. Licence exceptions under the EAR – such as EAR99 status, or specific exceptions for certain end users or end uses – operate independently of OFAC authorisations and are assessed on different criteria.

For businesses in Singapore and Japan, which have their own autonomous sanctions regimes, the additional question is whether a transaction permitted under OFAC and OFSI is also authorised under the applicable country regime. Singapore's autonomous measures and Japan's foreign exchange and trade controls each have their own authorisation mechanisms, and eligibility under US or UK instruments does not confer authorisation under those regimes.

The practical implication is that a transaction requiring multiple authorisations must satisfy each independently. The slowest or most restrictive authorisation governs the timeline.

The position above covers the standard analytical framework. Your facts – the specific counterparty, the goods or technology, the jurisdictions involved, and the authorisation instruments in play – change the analysis materially.

If you are assessing eligibility across multiple regimes for a pending transaction, contact Calder & Vance at info@caldervance.com for a cross-regime eligibility review.

Risk flags: where eligibility assessments fail

Compliance failures in this area typically fall into a small number of categories. Identifying them in advance is more efficient than addressing them after a transaction has closed or a filing has been refused.

Incomplete ownership mapping. The most common single failure. A general licence that excludes SDN-owned entities cannot be relied upon unless the full ownership chain has been mapped to the point of comfort. A partial trace that stops at the first non-listed layer provides no assurance if a blocked person holds an indirect stake above the threshold.

Assuming parallel authorisations. Because OFAC and OFSI issue separate instruments, an authorisation under one does not confer eligibility under the other. Teams that check only the regime they know best and assume the other aligns are taking an undocumented risk.

Relying on a lapsed or amended general licence. General licences are amended and revoked with regularity. A compliance programme that does not include a monitoring process for changes to the authorisations it relies upon is operating on stale analysis.

Missing a reporting obligation triggered by reliance on a general licence. Some OFSI general licences require the user to notify OFSI within a defined period of relying on the instrument. Missing that notification can convert an otherwise lawful transaction into a reportable breach.

Overlooking the export-control layer. Payments may be authorised by OFAC; the goods or technology transfer may still require a BIS or ECJU licence. The financial sanctions analysis and the export-control analysis must both be completed, not just one of them.

Assuming a prior eligibility determination holds. Sanctions lists change. A counterparty that was eligible under a general licence at the time of a first transaction may have been added to a list, or may have acquired a blocked person as a new shareholder, by the time of a second transaction. Eligibility must be verified at each transaction, not carried forward from prior screenings.

If a transaction has already been flagged under either regime, or if a specific licence has been refused, an early review can preserve options that narrow with time. Contact us at info@caldervance.com.

A common misconception: general licences versus specific licences

A persistent myth in cross-border compliance is that a general licence is simply a lesser or provisional version of a specific licence, and that applying for a specific licence is always the safer or more thorough route. This is not accurate, and acting on it creates unnecessary cost and delay.

General licences issued by OFAC or OFSI are fully valid authorisations. A transaction that meets all conditions of a general licence is authorised, period. Applying for a specific licence in a situation where a general licence already applies wastes resources and signals to the authority that the applicant has not conducted a proper eligibility analysis – which can affect the authority's assessment of the firm's overall compliance culture.

Conversely, assuming a general licence applies when eligibility has not been properly confirmed is not a conservative position; it is an unassessed risk. The correct approach is a documented eligibility analysis: confirm each condition of the general licence against the verified facts of the transaction, record that analysis, and retain the record for the required period. If any condition is not met, either restructure so that it is met, or apply for a specific licence.

We regularly advise clients who have been operating on an assumed general licence eligibility for a series of transactions. Regularising the position – documenting past reliance and strengthening the going-forward analysis – is a standard element of our compliance review work.

How Calder & Vance assists with licence-exception eligibility

In a recent matter, a manufacturing business with operations in the UK and the United States sought to supply components to a buyer in a third market. The buyer's parent had a minority stake held by a person subject to sanctions under both regimes. We mapped the full ownership chain, assessed the control question under both OFSI's test and OFAC's 50 percent rule, and identified that the transaction required reliance on an OFSI general licence with a reporting obligation and a parallel OFAC analysis under the relevant programme. We prepared the OFSI notification and the OFAC eligibility memorandum concurrently. The transaction completed within the commercial timeline, and the compliance record was complete at closing.

Our work on licence-exception eligibility covers:

  • Mapping ownership and control chains under both the OFAC 50 percent rule and the OFSI ownership and control test
  • Assessing eligibility against the specific conditions of the applicable general licence or programme authorisation under each regime
  • Identifying where a specific licence application is required and preparing and submitting that application, with management of the regulator's queries
  • Advising on the reporting obligations triggered by general-licence reliance
  • Reviewing the export-control layer under the EAR and the ECJU regime, and classifying the item, confirming licence requirements and exceptions, and designing the end-use controls
  • Designing monitoring processes for general-licence amendments and list changes
  • Preparing compliance records that document eligibility determinations and retain the required information

Related practices:

Frequently asked questions

Where do the regimes diverge on licence-exception eligibility?
OFAC and OFSI diverge on four main points: the legal basis for each authorisation (programme-specific regulations versus SAMLA and thematic instruments); the ownership and control test (OFAC's mechanical 50 percent threshold versus OFSI's broader control limb); the scope and conditions stated in each general licence (which are not harmonised); and the reporting obligations triggered by reliance. A transaction eligible under one regime must be separately verified against the other. The EU regime introduces a third set of conditions, and BIS adds an export-control layer for goods and technology with US-controlled content.
Which regime is stricter on licence-exception eligibility?
Neither regime is uniformly stricter; the answer depends on the specific transaction and counterparty. OFSI's control limb is broader than OFAC's ownership threshold, so it catches more ownership structures. OFAC's programme-specific authorisations can be more targeted and may permit transactions that OFSI's general licences do not cover, or vice versa. In practice, the most restrictive applicable condition across all relevant regimes governs the transaction. Running both analyses in parallel from the outset is the only way to identify which regime creates the binding constraint.
What should a cross-border business do about licence-exception eligibility?
A cross-border business should run a documented eligibility analysis for each regime separately before relying on any general licence. The analysis should confirm every stated condition against verified transaction facts, map the full ownership chain to the depth required by the authorisation, and identify any reporting obligation triggered by reliance. Where a condition is not met, the transaction should be restructured or a specific licence application prepared. The analysis and the supporting record should be retained for the required period under each applicable regime. Specialist counsel should be involved where the ownership structure is complex or the authorisation conditions are unclear.

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This publication is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on your situation, contact info@caldervance.com.